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NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IN THE OPERATION OF AN
AUTOMOBILE: KENTUCKY'S 1952 STATUTE

By ROBERT C. MOFFIT*
By the great weight of authority in this country today, ordinary
negligence is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of negligent
manslaughter either under homicide statutes or as a common law
crime.' That degree of negligence which is required for criminal
responsibility is usually described as "gross negligence", "reckless
conduct", or words of similar connotation. 2 While at common law
the unintentional killing of a human being resulting from the
failure to exercise the proper degree of care to avoid danger to
others constituted manslaughter or even murder under certain circumstances, 3 the negligent homicide, as a crime, is of much greater
frequency and resulting importance today than ever before due
to the greatly increasing number of deaths caused by the careless
operation of motor vehicles.
This pressing problem of traffic fatalities and the difficulty of
securing convictions in such cases under existing law has been
considered sufficiently important by sixteen states to warrant
special legislation creating a new and lesser crime. 4 Apparently
the purpose of these statutes is to obtain more convictions and
consequently provide for punishment in cases where juries have
been reluctant to convict the defendant of manslaughter because
they have felt that both the crime and its punishment were too
harsh to apply to the situation. While these statutes differ considerably in regard to the name of the offense, the maximum
Student Editor-in-Chief, Kentucky Law Journal, University of Kentucky.
'MrtER, CanmqNAL LAW 287 (1934); MOrEAND, RATIONALE OF CnMNAL
NEGLIGENCE 16 (1944); 65 CoR. JuR. SECuN. 1270 (1950); 61 CoR. JUR. SECtrN.
774 (1949); 40 Con. Jur. SECUN. 924 (1944).
2

ibid.

'See 99 A. L. R.756 (1935).
'6 Aruc. STAT. ANN. sec. 75-1001 (1947); COL. PEN. CODE sec. 198-3
(Deering 1941); CONN. GEN. STAT. sec. 492b (Supp. 1951); D. C. CODE see.
40-606 (1940); 8 IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 47-2001 (Burns Replacement 1952); KANS.
GEN. STKT. ANN. sec. 8-529 (Cum. Supp. 1947); LEGISLATIVE AcTs OF Ky. c. 51
(1952); LA. CR. CODE ANN. art. 740-32 (1948); 1 MINN. STAT. sec. 169.11
(1945); 1 N. H. REv. LAws c. 118 sec. 12 (1942); 1 N. J. REv. STAT. sec. 2:138-9
(1987); N. Y. Cnma. CODE sec. 1053a (Thompson 1939); 4A OmIo GEN. CODE
ANN. sec. 6307-18 (1945); VT. Pui. LAws sec. 10, 286 (1933); Wis. STAT. ANN.
see. 340.271 (1949); 4 Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. sec. 60-413 (1945).
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amount of punishment which can be inflicted and the degree of
culpability required, they all have one common purpose, viz., to
obtain more convictions5 and thus by punishment curb the most
frequent "killer" of modern times-careless, negligent and reckless
driving.
Concentrating upon this one ultimate object, to secure more
convictions, and feeling that juries regard manslaughter as too
harsh a crime for most negligent homicides resulting from traffic
accidents, the state legislatures passing these statutes have given
the offense a new name, usually terming it "Involuntary Homicide,"' 6 "Negligent Homicide" or words of similar import. It is
conspicuous that the term "manslaughter" has been omitted from
these statutes.8
Seven of the sixteen states which have passed such statutes
have not only changed the name and reduced the punishment of
the crime but have also lowered the degree of negligence required
for a conviction. 9 These states have abandoned the requirement
of the higher degree of negligence necessary for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter and require only ordinary negligence. 10
It seems probable that this is the most successful way to achieve
the desired end--criminal convictions in a greater number of cases.
The 1952 Kentucky Legislature apparently placed Kentucky
within this latter group of states by passing the following statute:"
"Any person who, by negligent operation of a motor
vehicle, causes the death of another, under circumstances
not otherwise punishable as a homicide, shall be imprisoned
in the county jail for not more than one year."
isMoRELND,

LAw OF

HocmE 249 (1952).

ANN. art. 740-32 (1943).
STAT. ANN. see. 75-1001 (1947).

'LA. CR. CODE

'Arx.
8

Supra note 4 with the exception of Ohio where it is termed second degree
manslaughter. 4A Omo GEN. CODE ANN. see. 6307-18 (1945).
'CONN. GEN. STAT. sec. 492b (Supp. 1951); D. C. CODE sec. 40-606 (1940);
KANs. GEN. STAT. ANN. see. 8-529 (Cum. Supp. 1951); LEGIsL.ATIVn AcTs OF KY.
c. 51 (1952); 4A Orno GEN. CODE ANN. sec. 6307-18 (1945); VT. PUB. LAws see.

10,286 (1947); Wis. STAT. ANN. see. 340.271 (1949).
oState v. Phelps, 151 Kan. 199, 97 P. 2d 1105 (1940); State ex rel. Shields v.
Portman, 242 Wis. 5, 6 N.W. 2d 713 (1942); Ohio's statute requires only that the
defendant be "engaged in the violation of the laws of the state of Ohio applying
to the use or regulations of traffic. . ." State v. Yudick, 155 Ohio St. 269, 98 N.E.
2d 415 (1951); While no cases could be found for Conn., D. C., or Vt., under the
wording of their respective statutes it would appear that they only require ordinary
negligence
for a conviction.
I LEcISLATrV
AcTS OF Ky. c. 51 (1952).

NEGLIGENT Ho.IIDE

It will be noted not only that the statute does not mention the
word manslaughter, but also that it requires only "negligent
operation."
It would appear from an examination of the Kentucky law
prior to the passing of this statute that the legislature intended to
reduce the degree of negligence necessary for a conviction from
"gross" to "ordinary negligence." Prior to the decision in Marye
v. Commonwealth12 handed down in 1951 the law had been that
ordinary negligence in the operation of an automobile which
caused the death of a human being was sufficient culpability to
sustain a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, 13 which is a
common law crime in this jurisdiction 14 and which, interestingly
enough, carried the same maximum punishment as this new
vehicle statute. 15 The Marye case, however, overruled this long
line of cases and held that in order to convict one of involuntary
manslaughter there has to be a finding of a higher degree of negligence-gross negligence-in order to authorize a conviction. 16
Within a year from the time of this decision we find the legislature
passing the statute under discussion. 7 Since the amount of punishment has not been changed, apparently the only function
which the statute could serve would be the lowering of the degree
of negligence required from gross negligence to "negligence."' 8
There may well be framed a strong argument against making
any kind of ordinary civil negligence grounds for a criminal
prosecution. However, it is believed by the writer that the imperative necessity of taking some kind of action in order to minimize the number of traffic fatalities more than justifies the creation
of this new offense.
An interesting and important problem raised by the group
-240 S.W. 2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
'Lewis v. Corn., 301 Ky. 268, 191 S.W. 2d 416 (1945); Lowe v. Corn., 298
Ky. 7, 181 S.W. 2d 409 (1944); Corn. v. Mullins, 296 Ky. 190, 176 S.W. 2d 403
(1943); Jones v. Corn., 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164 (1926); Held v. Corn., 183
Ky. 209, 208 S.W. 772 (1919).
"Sikes v. Corn., 304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W. 2d 956 (1947).
Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 431.075 (1950).
"Supra note 12.

"Supra note 11.
See Moreland, A Suggested Homicide Statute for Kentucky, 41 Ky. L. J. -,
(1952) where Professor Moreland, in discussing the new Kentucky Statute, comes
to the conclusion that it would be quite possible under the wording of the statute
for the court in construing it to require a higher degree of negligence, vz., recklessness, inorder to support a conviction.
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of vehicle statutes which only require ordinary negligence for a
conviction is presented by the deep-seated rule of criminal law
that contributory negligence is no defense to a criminal prosecution. 19 This is based upon the reasoning that the state, being the
primary party interested in a criminal prosecution, punishes the
defendant for his act, which is either criminal or not, regardless of
the conduct of the other party.20 It seems logical, however, that
when social and public reasons necessitate the making of an essentially civil wrong a criminal offense, it is only fair and just to
allow the defendant in such case to use that defense which has for
so long a time been recognized in civil cases as a complete defense
to actions based upon negligence. 21 It is believed that, in order to
eliminate the possibility of one being guilty of a crime where
under tort law he would have available a valid defense, the court
in construing the new statute could avoid this anomaly by adopting the defense of contributory negligence 22 as a necessary corol23
lary to the statute.

State v. Custer, 129 Kan. 281, 282 P. 1071 (1929); Held v. Com., 183 Ky.
209, 208 S.W. 772 (1919); Thiede v. State, 106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W. 570 (1921),
Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W. 565 (1926); State v. Busby, 102 Utah
416, 131 P. 2d 510 (1942); Maxon v. State, 177 Wis. 379, 187 N.W. 753 (1922).
'See MAY's, CnmflnxL LAw 22-24 (3rd ed. 1905).
PnossER, ToRTs 393 (1941).
= The fact that the state is the primary party interested in a criminal prosecution might be pointed to as a reason for denying the defendant the use of such a
defense as contributory negligence. However, it is felt that in as much as such a
defense is only available against a charge of ordinary negligence and would avail
the defendant nothing against a charge of a higher degree of negligence that it
would be useful in balancing the argument against the general use of ordinary
negligence as a basis for a criminal prosecution.
' In the Mayre case, supra note 12, the court held that the defendant was
entitled to an instruction on "sudden emergency" as a defense to negligent manslaughter, saying: "Although we know of no criminal case directly in point there
is ample authority for such an instruction in civil cases, and there is no valid
reason why the same rule should not apply in a criminal case." 240 S.W. 2d 852,
856 (Ky. 1951). It is believed that the same reasoning could be adopted to allow
the defendant the defense of contributory negligence.

